In addition, following the PNGMDR public debate and in line with the joint decision of the Ministry for the Ecological Transition and the ASN, the PNGMDR project owners, several draught regulations allowing the recovery of VLLW metals were put outs for public consultation, which was held from 4 January to 4 February 2021, and which concluded with favourable opinions of the Technological Risks Prevention Council (CSPRT) and the ASN. On 15 February 2022, the decree that defines the categories of substances that are eligible for recovery and the government order that determines the rules on the exemption application needed to recover these substances were published. In this context, EDF is continuing the studies undertaken with a view to building a cutting and fusion facility to process and recover VLLW metal waste from decommissioning operations in France and abroad. This project, called Techno centre, is being carried out by EDF in collaboration with Orano. The objective is to commission the facility, which is proposed to be located at the Fessenheim site, by 2031.
EDF also conducts both its own R&D activities and R&D with a network of partners(nuclear operators, manufacturers, VSBs and SMEs, institutional and academic players), on the twin themes of the management of radioactive waste and decommissioning. EDF is a recognised leader in these fields and is taking part in seven EU projects to improve the performance of waste management and decommissioning projects, develop its expertise, and contribute to the development and implementation of the best international practices.
Each year, EDF makes provisions for the downstream side of the nuclear fuel cycle in France (see note 15 in the notes to the consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2021 in section 6.1).
EDF’s industrial goal for the preparation for the future of the nuclear fleet rests primarily on the following strategic areas:
On 10 February 2022 (1), EDF and GE announced the signature of an exclusive agreement for EDF to acquire part of GE Steam Power’s nuclear power activities. The proposed transaction would cover GE Steam Power’s conventional island equipment for new nuclear power plants, including Arabelle turbines, as well as maintenance and upgrades for existing nuclear power plants (outside the Americas). Given the context of the Ukrainian conflict, see also section 2.2 "Risks to which the Group is exposed".
On 15 September 2011 and in light of the accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan, EDF submitted 19 additional safety assessment reports to the ASN, at its request, one for each of its nuclear sites, encompassing all its existing reactors and all those under construction.
The safety of EDF’s nuclear fleet is based on the principle of continuous improvement: Existing and new facilities continuously benefit from feedback from all power plants. Lessons are learnt from incidents and accidents that may occur in the world.
These assessments consisted of re-examining the defences of existing power plants and those under construction, in light of the events in Japan, taking into account issues set out in the specifications drafted by the safety authorities.
Thus, the safety margins were reassessed against the risks of earthquakes and flooding, when dealing with situations of simultaneous loss of the cooling source and power supplies and the consequences of severe accidents.
These assessments also led to inquire whether certain changes to the scenarios planned beyond situations used for the sizing of the protection systems, would lead to a worsening of the consequences in terms of safety (“cliff effects”).
They finally led to deterministically consider the extreme situations that substantially exceed those used in the design of nuclear installations and subsequent safety reviews.
Finally, the ASAs also re-examined the rules applied in outsourcing.
These analyses confirmed first and foremost the adequate level of security throughout the EDF nuclear power fleet, particularly because of the periodic reviews carried out in France since the end of the 1980s. EDF also proposed additional measures to the ASN that exceed those considered for sizing safety systems, to contribute to further improving the safety level of power plants.
In its opinion to the government published on 3 January 2012, the ASN states, on the basis of the analyses of its technical support, that “after the additional safety assessments on priority nuclear facilities, the ASN considers that the facilities examined show an adequate level of safety, and that it will not thus request the immediate shutdown of any of them”. At the same time, the ASN considers that “continuing to operate these facilities requires increasing their robustness, as soon as possible, to an extent beyond existing safety margins, to handle extreme situations”.
The ASN also recommended the “hard core” concept and the FARN system (see section 1.4.1.1.2.2 “Environment, nuclear safety, radiation protection”). The “hardcore” is made up of the plant’s structures, systems and components that can withstand situations studied in connection with ASAs. On 26 June 2012, the ASN made 19 decisions requiring EDF to follow over 600 technical requirements, which set regulatory requirements according to the post-Fukushima action plan. These technical rules require that all nuclear sites must have an organisation and local crisis centres resistant to the occurrence of a large-scale event affecting several facilities. For EDF power plants, the prescribed “hard core” must in particular have“bunkerised” electrical resources in each unit.
The provisions of the French Environmental Code do not set a limit on operating life but require a review of facilities every ten years in light of applicable rules and updates of assessments of the risks facilities pose to protected interests, taking into account the state of the facilities, the experience gained during their operation, new developments in nuclear science, and rules applying to similar facilities (safety standards).
EDF’s industrial strategy is to operate the fleet beyond 40 years in the best conditions of safety and performance, considering the significant investment linked to the third ten-year inspections and the post-Fukushima improvements, on the one hand, and the energy needs of France on the other. This target is consistent with trends observed around the world for reactors using similar technologies. To thousands, EDF has implemented industrial and R&D action plans. Actions have been launched to renew the major components that can be renewed and solutions are being studied to demonstrate the capacity of non-replaceable equipment such as the confinement containment building and reactor vessels, to ensure their operation up to 60 years.
An extension to the life of the current nuclear fleet must enable, whilst respecting the absolute priority of nuclear safety, better use of the industrial base it represents.
In the first half of 2016, all the technical, economic and governance conditions necessary to match the amortization period of the 900 MW power plants in the French nuclear fleet with the Group’s industrial strategy were met. On 28 July 2016, the Board of Directors of EDF approved the extension of the accounting amortisation periods of PWR 900 MW series power plants in France (excluding Fessenheim) from 40 to 50 years from 1 January 2016 onwards, without prejudice to the ASN’s position on the measures suggested by EDF for each of the nuclear units in question.
This approval on the extension is based on the technical capacity of the PWR 900MW fleet facilities to operate for at least 50 years, supported by international benchmarks, as well as by the investments made progressively under the Grand Carénage programme. These investments will enable the PWR 900 MW series to reach a level of safety as close as possible to that of the EPR, and one of the highest internationally, after its fourth ten-year inspection (VD4).
(1) See EDF’s press release of 10 February 2022 “EDF Signs an Exclusive Agreement to Acquire Part of GE Steam Power’s Nuclear Activities”.
