Universal Registration Document 2021

2. Risk factors and control framework

  • In 2016, the Board of Directors approved the extension in the consolidated financial statements of the depreciation period for 900MW PWR plants, except Fessenheim, from 40 years to 50 years, without anticipating the decisions of the ASN on the provisions proposed by EDF on a reactor-by-reactor basis after each 10-year inspection. It cannot be ruled out that the extension of the operating life of certain 900MW reactors may not be authorised, but an important step has been taken with the generic opinion issued by the ASN on 23 February 2021.
  • The continuing operation of the other series of France’s nuclear fleet (1,300MW and 1,450MW), which are more recent, remains an industrial objective for the Group. In 2021, the Board of Directors approved extending the depreciation period of the 1,300MW PWR plants from 40 years to 50 years in the consolidated financial statements. This accounting estimate is not indicative of the decisions to authorise continued operation, which will be given unit by unit by the Safety Authority after each ten-year inspection, as required by law.
  • The potential risks of the Grand Carénage programme include a possible delay in the appraisal of the authorisations required to start operations, in particular as regards the authorisations expected from the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN). Such uncertainties may also concern the manufacture and delivery on site of new equipment or work carried out on-site in a situation where a large number of industrial operations are being carried out at the same time. Any delays caused by the health crisis may also mean that the work will not be able to be completed within the stipulated timeframe. Furthermore, the Group may not receive the expected operating lifespan extension from the competent authorities. Such extensions could also be obtained under certain conditions, the financial impact of which, in particular in terms of investments, could affect the Group’s strategy with respect to extending the operating life of its reactors or the Group’s ability to pursue its global investment strategy. These events could have a significant negative impact on the Group’s financial position.
  • Finally, should the health crisis worsen or last, it could affect the achievement of operating targets and the success of maintenance projects, including the Grand Carénage projects.
Nuclear facilities in the United Kingdom
  • Given the nuclear safety rules applicable in the United Kingdom and AGR authorisations from the ONR when the time comes to operate its existing nuclear reactors until the currently planned (AGR) or potential (Sizewell B) end of operation date, or may obtain such authorisations under conditions involving significant expenditure or investment by the Group.
  • The ongoing analysis of graphite ageing in the AGR (Advanced Gas Reactor) may lead to prolonged unavailability or early shutdown of the reactors. The cracking of graphite subjected to irradiation must be carefully monitored, with inspections carried out regularly, and controlled by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), to ensure that there is sufficient knowledge of the core to justify continued operation. Following decisions taken in August 2020 and November 2020, Hunterston B was permanently shut down on 7 January 2022 while Hinkley Point B will permanently cease production by July 2022. Following a life review of the AGRs in December 2021, the projected final shutdown dates for Heysham 2 and Torness have been brought forward from 2030 to March 2028.
  • An accelerated fuel withdrawal strategy would be implemented in the event of any risk of an early shutdown of the other AGR plants. If this strategy were to be adopted, a reexamination of the value of the assets may be required.
  • Given the ageing of the British fleet and the many technical difficulties encountered, the future level of output of the AGRs currently in service is very uncertain.
Other nuclear facilities
  • For nuclear reactors where EDF is not in charge of operation but has financial interests (Belgium, China), the Group is also financially exposed to some risks. The Group may need to contribute up to the amount of its share to costly repairs or modifications to be carried out on these units or to events that may France and the United Kingdom, the nuclear safety authorities in these countries may take decisions that require additional work or controls, in particular as regards exploiting feedback from international experience and anticipating potentially precursory events. The Group is also exposed in terms of the value of its assets.
Other risks
  • Furthermore, despite the quality of operations and the changes made by the Group to its nuclear facilities, it cannot be ruled out that some of these facilities will be subject to special operating conditions to reinforce the operating safety margins at the initiative of the nuclear operator responsible for nuclear safety or at the request of the Nuclear Safety Agency.
  • Finally, a potential serious nuclear accident not involving the Group but with widespread consequences worldwide could lead the safety authorities to require new reactor upgrades, applicable to the Group’s reactors, and to those in which the Group has a stake
c) Control actions

These action plans for this risk are carried out by all the operational engineering and operating teams of the nuclear fleet, particularly in the context of the Start 2025 and Grand Carénage projects (see section 1.4.1.1.2.1).

During the ten-year inspections, the safety assessment makes it possible to increase the level of safety by taking into account, on the one hand, international best practices and, on the other hand, the condition of the facilities, the experience acquired during operation and the evolution of the knowledge and rules applicable to similar facilities.

The increase in the number of VD4s carried out each year (1 in 2019, 1 in 2020, 4 in 2021, and 5 in 2022) and the increase in the load on the industrial fabric is the subject of an approach involving the main suppliers of the fleet in operation in order to have a multiannual vision of the load and to enable the entire nuclear industry to take the necessary measures (in terms of resources, contractual terms, standardisation, etc.) to secure the success of the industrial programme for the fleet in operation.

Since December 2019, the Group has been implementing the Excell plan, which aims to enable the French nuclear industry to return to the highest level of rigour, quality and excellence in order to keep up with major projects and meet the needs of existing nuclear power plants in France and the United Kingdom (see section 1.4.1.1.1 “The Excell plan”).

With regard to stress corrosion phenomena, EDF is continuing to define a plan for inspections throughout the nuclear fleet, with the aim of carrying them out by the end of 2022, during scheduled maintenance and fuel renewal outages for several 1,300MW and 900MW reactors, particularly those undergoing 10-yearly inspections. EDF is continuing its studies to complete its knowledge of the phenomenon and has initiated the development of new ultrasonic inspection mehtods capable of measuring the cracks depth. EDF plans to check some of its reactors with these new methods from September 2022 until the end of 2023.

Controls may be further extended within the nuclear fleet, in close consultation with the ASN, and result in an action plan in addition to the already scheduled maintenance actions.

In the United Kingdom, risk control is also based on:

  • ongoing interactions with the regulator on safety cases relating to the life cycle of facilities, assessment by the regulator and requirements for licences;
  • the graphite management and ageing monitoring programme on the AGR fleet, with frequent graphite inspections, in particular at Heysham 2 and Torness;
  • sizewell B’s long-term operating programme to manage the production of the business case in support of the decision on the investment programme required for the extension of the operating life;
  • reviews, as appropriate, of the life cycle of the AGRs and actions to prepare for fuel retirement in the event of early closure;
  • strategies for preventive monitoring and maintenance of facilities to enable consideration at an early stage of problems that could lead to loss of generation.