EDF is engaged in a process to control energy consumption through various measures developed by national legislation, in application of European Union Directives.
In France, the Law of 13 July 2005 introduced a system of energy savings certificates. Suppliers of energy (electricity, gas, heat, cold, domestic fuel oil and fuel for vehicles) with sales above a certain level became subject to energy savings obligations, initially for a three-year period.
To meet this obligation, three sources are available to the EDF group: supporting consumers in their energy efficiency operations, funding ministry-approved energy savings certificate schemes, and purchasing certificates from eligible actors.
EDF accounts for energy savings certificates in compliance with Articles 616-1 to 616-25 of ANC regulation 2014-03 on the national chart of accounts.
EDF holds energy savings certificates in order to meet the requirements of the regulations on energy savings. Consequently, EDF applies the “Energy Savings” model defined by the ANC regulation.
Certificates obtained or receivable are recorded in inventories at production or acquisition cost, and are valued under the FIFO (first in first out) method.
At the year-end, only the net position is presented in the financial statements:
NB: The following information should be read in conjunction with note 2.7 to the 2018 financial statements.
On 11 April 2019(1), EDF announced that it was aware of the opinion of the Permanent Group of experts for nuclear pressure equipment (GP ESPN), made public on 11 April 2019, regarding the quality deviations affecting the welds located on the main steam transfer pipes covered by the break preclusion principle(2) at the Flamanville EPR.
The Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) had held a meeting of the GP ESPN on 9 April 2019 as part of its investigation into these quality deviations:
EDF indicated at the time that the recommendations and solution avenues suggested by the Permanent Group of experts could have an impact on the commissioning schedule and construction cost, and that EDF would continue its discussions with the ASN, which was to issue its decision regarding action to be taken on this matter a few weeks later.
Consequently, EDF stated that a detailed update of the schedule and construction cost for the Flamanville EPR would be given after the ASN’s decision had been published.
On 20 June 2019(3), EDF announced that it was aware of the decision issued by the ASN in its letter of 19 June 2019 regarding the quality deviations affecting the welds located on the main steam transfer pipes covered by the break preclusion principle at the Flamanville EPR.
In that letter, the ASN asked EDF to repair the eight containment penetration welds at the Flamanville EPR that were not compliant with the break preclusion principle.
On 26 July 2019(4), EDF announced that three scenarios for upgrading the penetration welds were under consideration, and that after a detailed examination of the three scenarios and discussions with the ASN, EDF would communicate the schedule and cost implications of the selected scenario in the next few months. EDF also stated that commissioning could not be expected before the end of 2022.
This work resulted in discussions with the ASN, which sent EDF(5) a letter on 4 October concerning the technical feasibility of these three scenarios.
The penetration weld repair scenario preferred by EDF involves the use of remote-operated robots, designed to conduct high-precision operations inside the piping concerned. This technology has been developed for nuclear power plants in operation and must be qualified for penetration weld repairs. The aim is to qualify this scenario with validation by the ASN by the end of 2020, at which date EDF will be able to initiate the repair work. A second scenario involving extraction and realignment work in the Safeguard Auxiliary Buildings is held at this stage as a fall-back solution.
Based on this penetration weld repair strategy, the EDF Board of Directors approved continuation of the Flamanville EPR construction at a meeting held on 8 October 2019.
(1) Cf. press release of 11 April 2019.
(2) The break preclusion principle is a very high standard of quality with stricter requirements than nuclear pressure equipment regulations for the design, manufacturing and in-service monitoring of certain items of equipment. These stricter requirements must be sufficient to consider that rupture of this equipment is highly unlikely. (When this standard is applied, a comprehensive study of the consequences of breaks in this piping is not required in the plant safety case).
(3) Cf. press release of 20 June 2019.
(4) Cf. press release of 26 July 2019.
(5) Cf. press release of 9 October 2019.
