LLW-LL waste comes from the decommissioning of the old NUGG reactors (graphite, processing waste – see section 1.4.1.1.6 “Decommissioning of nuclear power plants”). The Law of 28 June 2006 provides for a specific near-surface storage for this waste. In July 2015, ANDRA transmitted a report on the feasibility of a storage centre on a site located in the Soulaines region (Aube) in France. This report was submitted to the ASN for its opinion. Work is currently ongoing, as part of the national plan for the management of radioactive materials and radioactive waste(PNGMDR) to identify the waste that could be taken on. Furthermore, studies conducted by EDF to characterise more precisely the radiological inventory of this waste have led to significant gains. As a result the possibility of storing part of the graphite (particularly that of the Chinon A2 reactor) in existing surface facilities can be reconsidered.
Short-Lived Very Low-, Low- and Intermediate-Level Wastes come from the operation of nuclear facilities (gloves, filters, resins, etc.) and their decommissioning (concrete, scrap, lagging, piping, etc.). They are stored above ground in the Soulaines and Morvilliers storage facilities run by ANDRA in the Aube departement.
In order to minimise volumes, some waste is treated beforehand by melting or incineration at the Centraco plant owned by Cyclife France (part of Cyclife Holding, as subsidiary of EDF). In 2016, following the acquisition of the English and Swedish Assets of Studsvik, the holding company “Cyclife” was created to bring together all the newly acquired assets and centralise the Group’s internal and external activities in regard to waste treatment. 2019 also saw an expansion in the scope of the Cyclife holding company to include decommissioning, with the creation of two new subsidiaries: Cyclife Engineering and Graphitech (owned jointly by EDF and Veolia),tasked with developing decommissioning solutions for various technologies (in the main, Cyclife Engineering handles light water reactors and waste processing installations, while Graphitech deals with graphite reactors).
Each year, EDF makes provisions for the downstream side of the nuclear fuel cycle in France (see note 32 of the appendix to the consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2019 in section 6.1).
EDF’s industrial goal for the preparation for the future of the nuclear fleet rests primarily on the following strategic areas:
On 15 September 2011 and in light of the accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan, EDF submitted 19 Additional Safety Assessment reports to the ASN, one for each of its nuclear sites, encompassing all its existing reactors and all those under construction.
These assessments consisted of re-examining the defences of existing power plants and those under construction, in light of the events in Japan, taking into account issues set out in the specifications drafted by the safety authorities. Thus, the safety margins were assessed against the risks of earthquakes and flooding, when dealing with situations of simultaneous loss of the cooling source and power supplies and the consequences of severe accidents. These assessments also led to inquire whether certain changes to the scenarios planned beyond situations used for the sizing of the protection systems, would lead to a worsening of the consequences in terms of safety (“cliff effects”) and finally to deterministically consider the extreme situations that substantially exceed those used in the design of nuclear installations and subsequent safety reviews. The safety of EDF’s nuclear fleet is based on the principle of continuous improvement: existing and new facilities continuously benefit from feedback from all power plants, and lessons are learnt from incidents and accidents that may occur in the world.
Finally, the ASAs also re-examined the rules applied in outsourcing.
These analyses confirmed first and foremost the adequate level of security throughout the EDF nuclear power fleet, particularly because of the periodic reviews carried out in France since the end of the 1980s and codified by the Law on nuclear transparency and safety (the TSN Law) of June 2006, and codified later in the French Environmental Code. EDF also proposed additional measures to the ASN that exceed those considered for sizing safety systems, to contribute to further improving the current safety level of power plants.
In its opinion to the government published on 3 January 2012, the ASN states, on the basis of the analyses of its technical support, that “after the additional safety assessments on priority nuclear facilities, the ASN considers that the facilities examined show an adequate level of safety, and that it will not thus request the immediate shutdown of any of them”. At the same time, the ASN considers that“continuing to operate these facilities requires increasing their robustness, as soon as possible, to an extent beyond existing safety margins, to handle extreme situations”.
The ASN also recommended the “hard core” concept and the FARN system (see section 1.4.1.1.3 “Environment, nuclear safety, radiation protection”). The “hardcore” will be made up of the plant’s structures, systems and components that can withstand situations studied in connection with ASAs. On 26 June 2012, the ASN made 19 decisions requiring EDF to follow over 600 technical requirements, which set regulatory requirements according to the post-Fukushima action plan. These technical rules require that all nuclear sites must have an organisation and local crisis centres resistant to the occurrence of a large-scale event affecting several facilities. For EDF power plants, the prescribed “hard core” must in particular have “bunkerised” electrical resources in each unit. In the meantime, a temporary back-up diesel generator was installed at each of the 58 units in 2013. The complete definition of the “hard core” was covered in technical rules issued by the ASN in January 2014.
The provisions of the French Environmental Code do not set a limit on operating life but require a review of facilities every ten years in light of applicable rules and updates of assessments of the risks facilities pose to protected interests, taking into account the state of the facilities, the experience gained during their operation, new developments in nuclear science, and rules applying to similar facilities (safety standards).
