2. Risk factors and control framework

4A – Management of large and complex industrial projects (including EPR projects)

The Group carries out very large-scale projects. These projects represent a major risk for the Group in terms of the potential financial impact on its shareholders’ equity and implications for its development strategy. In particular, the success of EPR projects depends on specific industrial, regulatory and financial factors.

Criticality in view of the control actions undertaken: Strong.

As part of its activity and in its capacity as project owner or prime contractor, the Group is called upon to carry out projects that are inherently complex, require significant investments and lengthy procedures for construction and regulatory approvals. A very large number of stakeholders can be involved. The implementation of certain projects may lead EDF to set up industrial and/or financial partnerships. Projects may also need to be connected to local development projects or may encounter difficulties with respect to local approval. The control of these projects falls within the scope of corporate responsibility goal no. 5, which consists of developing a worldwide process of dialogue and consultation for projects (see section 3.3.1.2.5 “Dialogue and consultation for projects (CSRG no. 5)". In order to improve this control, the Group has embarked on an overhaul of its project management and has defined a “Commitments” policy that requires an analysis to be carried out of the risks and associated security issues.

Such projects may involve, in France or internationally, offshore facilities for new energies (off-shore wind power in France), the installation of new meters (Linky in France, handled by Enedis) on an entire distribution network concerning tens of millions of customers, in France or the United Kingdom, the implementation of hydraulic projects, or the implementation of large-scale nuclear investments over decades (“Grand Carénage”, EPR projects and decommissioning projects, in particular).

These projects are large-scale and long-duration projects; they involve numerous industrial partners and significant investments, for which the financing and pricing conditions may still be subject to confirmation. Given the economic or institutional climate, obtaining such funding may be delayed.

The implementation of these projects may give rise to numerous technical, industrial, operational, economic, regulatory, environmental or acceptability risks that could jeopardize project schedules, associated costs or profitability. There may also be difficulties in terms of relationships with the partners involved with EDF in these projects. Trade tensions between the United States and China could have an impact on the conduct of some of these projects given the technologies and partnerships implemented.

In this regard, in October 2018, the US Department of Energy (“US DoE”) issued a decision on civil nuclear cooperation with China which deals in particular with the transfer of US goods and technology, or goods and technology of US origin, to CGN, its subsidiaries and related entities. This decision concerns technologies relating to equipment within or directly attached to the vessel, core power control equipment and equipment that contains or is in direct contact with the primary fluid. On 14 August 2019, the United States Department of Commerce (“US DoC”) issued a ruling placing four CGN Group entities on the list of entities subject to restrictions (“Entity List”) concerning any transfer of goods and technology, in particular US dual-use goods and technology, or dual-use goods and technology of US origin (or including a certain percentage of US content) subject to the jurisdiction of the US DoC (export administration regulations: covering all goods and technology, in particular dual-use commercial goods and technology, other than those subject to the jurisdiction of the US DoE and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency). As a result of these decisions, the transfer of goods and technology to the entities in question for the technical scope covering them under the decisions, must be specifically authorised in advance by the competent US courts, with the presumption that such authorisation will be refused.

In addition, these projects require administrative authorisations, licenses or permits which may be subject to disputes, withdrawals or delays in obtaining them.

Such situations could, in particular in the event of non-compliance with the Group’s contractual commitments or the Group’s potential exposure in the event of major contingencies arising from the completion of these projects or the operation of these reactors, have a major impact on the Group’s business, results, asset value, financial position, reputation and outlook.

The success of EPR projects determines the performance and reputation of the nuclear industrial sector, and through it, those of the Group.

The Flamanville 3 project is a major industrial, regulatory and financial challenge for the Group. In particular, meeting the timetable and cost objectives is still dependent on:

  • implementing the action plan on the 53 welding seams to be reworked on the main secondary circuit piping, as well as those of the 8 crossings for which ASN has requested immediate repair. For these 8 welding seams, the preferred option of reworking by remotely-operated robots could run into difficulties, particularly in view of the innovative nature of this option;
  • successfully completing the start-up tests still to be carried out and the transfer to the operator;
  • obtaining the various authorisations which have yet to be issued by the ASN. In this context, as a precautionary measure, EDF submitted an application to amend the decree authorising its creation to the French Ministry for Ecological andSolidarity Transition on 11 March 2019 in order to extend the deadline for commissioning the reactor to April 2024;
  • the emergence of any other risks or failures.

In view of these considerations, the provisional timetable for implementing the preferred option for the reworking of crossing weld seams would lead, if the objective of ASN validation is met, to a fuel loading date at the end of 2022 and to re-estimating the construction cost at €12.4 billion, i.e. an increase of €1.5 billion. However, the Group could face other potentially significant additional costs and delays, in particular if the preferred option could not be implemented and the fallback scenario studied by EDF and based on extraction and refurbishment in the auxiliary back-up buildings (see section 1.4.1.2.1 “Flamanville 3 EPR project”) had to be used.

The construction cost to completion of €12.4 billion is expressed in 2015 euros and does not include interim financial interest. As this is a construction cost, it also does not include other elements necessary for the project such as spare parts for the subsequent operation of the plant.

The financial statements as at 31 December 2019 show in this respect (note 25.1 of the appendix to the consolidated financial statements as at 31/12/2019 – section 6.1 “Financial statements”) that:

  • the amount of interim interest amounts to €3,028 million;
  • the spare parts inventory, pre-operating costs and other tangible assets related to the project amount to €1,033 million.

Furthermore, these amounts correspond to costs incurred as of 31 December 2019, and not to costs anticipated to be incurred as at the fuel loading date scheduled for the end of 2022.

Studies for the EPR 2 Project are underway in order to propose a competitive reactor with a view to renewing the existing nuclear fleet. Failure to meet the competitiveness target, the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework, the failure to obtain or delays in obtaining, the necessary permits to continue the reactor’s development could have an impact on the Group’s financial position (see section 1.4.1.2 “New Nuclear projects – EPR 2”). On 25 January 2019, the French government published the main guidelines of the Multi-year Energy Programme. In accordance with these guidelines, the government has asked EDF to prepare a file with the nuclear industry by mid-2021 relating to a programme of renewal of nuclear facilities in France.

In China, the Group has a 30% stake in TNPJVC (Taishan Nuclear Power Joint Venture Company Limited) alongside its Chinese partner CGN. Taishan 1 was the first EPR reactor to be coupled to the grid on 29 June 2018. It was commissioned on 13 December 2018. The Taishan 2 reactor became commercially operational on 7 September 2019. The feed-in tariff for the electricity generated by Taishan has been set at RMB 435/MWh (approximately €56/MWh) for up to 7,500 operating hours per year per reactor, with any surplus being sold at market price. This tariff, which is below EDF’s expectations, will remain in force until the end of 2021. Efforts are still under way with the relevant Chinese authorities to determine its future development.

In the United Kingdom, control of the design and bringing the manufacturing and the major milestones of the construction site under control will determine the profitability of the Hinkley C project and the financing of any future projects in the United Kingdom. The Group has a 66.5% stake in the Hinkley Point C Project, alongside its Chinese partner CGN with 33.5% (see sections 1.4.1.2.2 “Other – New Nuclear projects” and section 1.4.5.1.2.4 “United Kingdom – Nuclear New Build Business”). In June 2019, the HPC project achieved milestone J-0 (completion of the unit 1nuclear island common raft) as planned. Following this major milestone, a review of the costs, schedule and organisation of the HPC project concluded that the risk of delaying the delivery of units 1 and 2 as previously announced (15 and 9 months respectively) had increased, and that the construction cost to complete the project is now estimated between £201521.5 billion and £201522.5 billion, an increase of £20151.9 billion to £20152.9 billion compared to the previous estimate. The range depends on the effectiveness of action plans to be delivered in partnership with contractors. The additional costs are mainly the result of difficult soil conditions, which made the earthworks more expensive than expected, the revision of the objectives of the operational action plans, and the additional costs related to the implementation of the functional design of a “first of a kind” plant adapted to the British regulatory context.